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BOOK REVIEW
What’s In a Name?
Ruling the Root, Milton L. Mueller, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002,
301 pages.
Jonathan Zittrain*
In the spring of 1998, the U.S. government told the Internet: Govern
yourself.
1 This unfocused order—a blandishment, really, expressed as an
awkward “statement of policy” by the Department of Commerce, carrying
no direct force of law—came about because the management of obscure
but critical centralized Internet functions was at a political crossroads.
In  Ruling the Root,
2 Milton L. Mueller thoroughly documents the
colorful history both before and after this moment of inflection, and gives a
fair appraisal both of the interests at stake and of the ways in which those
interests have influenced the course of that history. It is clear that he
laments the domination of latter parts of the tale by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), a California
nonprofit created expressly to answer the U.S. government’s 1998
challenge. Mueller finds ICANN to be at best a rigid, bureaucratic clamp
on the innovation that had previously marked the Internet space, and at
worst an instrument of old-guard “corporatist” interests bent on
maintaining (or replicating from other fields such as broadcast and
telephone) artificial scarcity of resources for the purpose of concentration
of control. The questions left open by Mueller’s inquiry are important, and
to understand both these and the depth of Mueller’s frustration with
* Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Assistant Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies,
Harvard Law School. I thank Megan Kirk for research help, Molly S. Van Houweling for
helpful suggestions, and Ben Edelman for line edits.
© 2002 Jonathan Zittrain.
1. Mgmt. of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741 (June 10, 1998),
available  at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm (Last visited
Sept. 24, 2002).
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ICANN, it helps to reflect on the unusual way in which coordination of the
global Net came about.
The Net had developed as a means of sharing information among
anyone who could hew to its protocols, and the authors of those protocols
were computer scientists and engineers of various stripes, engaged in a
loose collective enterprise funded without expectations of direct profit by
their commercial and nonprofit employers, and by the U.S. National
Science Foundation and Department of Defense. Loose, yes, but also with
elements of self-governance: The engineers who worked on Net protocols
came to know each other, to name themselves the Internet Engineering
Task Force (“IETF”), to select leaders from among themselves, and to
agree upon processes by which to reach closure on contested issues so that
the network could continue to develop.
3  “Rough consensus and running
code”
4 was the guiding creed: the latter provided an objective metric by
which to evaluate competing technical protocols; the former provided a
reminder that since many advances in a given area of internetworking
required everyone using that subsystem to agree upon a particular protocol,
less than unanimity on its details ought to be enough to constitute
“agreement” for all concerned. Moving forward was more important than
moving forward perfectly.
Mueller refines this account by noting tensions between the rank-and-
file engineers of the IETF and those who emerged as their leaders. Among
the alphabet soup of organizations involved in Internet engineering through
the 1990s with overlapping sets of participants, the Internet Architecture
Board (“IAB”) and the Internet Society—intended in their own respective
ways to serve as political or legal leadership for the informal IETF
collective—quickly ran into internal challenges to their legitimacy
generally, and methods of governing themselves specifically.
5 Mueller
highlights here what he calls the “technical cadre’s allergy to democratic
methods and public accountability,”
6 and suggests that this had a significant
influence on ICANN’s later formation, and he is right.
Democratic or not, the IETF standards process has been responsible
for the spectacularly successful bedrock elements on which the Internet
functions, ranging from core logical layer Transmission Control
3.S e e  INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, THE TAO OF IETF: A NOVICE’S GUIDE TO
THE  INTERNET  ENGINEERING  TASK  FORCE RFC 3160 (Aug. 2001), at
http://www.ietf.org/tao.html.
4. Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in O PEN SOURCES: VOICES
FROM THE OPEN  SOURCE  REVOLUTION (Mark Stone et al. eds., 1999), available at
http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/ietf.html.
5. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 94-98.
6. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 97.JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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Protocol/Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”) networking to e-mail interchange to
clock synchronization. Each of these reflects the desire to have all
networked entities interacting according to the same protocols—enabling
different brands and platforms of computers to communicate with each
other without bulky translation software or gateways.
In addition, certain elements of the Internet created through IETF
processes—most notably, its naming and numbering schemes, which
suppose the existence of unique identifiers such as www.cnn.com and
128.36.0.19 distributed among various Internet users—require some form
of central coordination, if only to ensure that uniqueness. Without central
coordination, two different Net destinations might advertise themselves as
possessing identical numeric or named identities, and data packets would
be misrouted on their way across the Net’s topography to a particular
destination. The coordination could, in theory, take the simple form of a
commonly shared list of those identities already “taken” by someone, and
indeed the “first-come, first-served” nature by which many domain names
are available to registrants reflects that idea. But whoever maintains a
common list typically has, as a technical matter, the ability simply to
change the list—perhaps delisting a name whose registrant has fallen
behind in yearly maintenance payments demanded by the list holder, or
reassigning a name previously reserved for one registrant to another
because that other has made a claim of right.
When a commons is large and the decent pastures well distributed
across it, there’s little reason for shepherds to fight for turf. But if there’s
any sense of scarcity—of the commons’ contents generally, or its “good
areas” specifically—there must be a way of forestalling or resolving a
stampede. By 1997, the Internet’s supply of “good” names was thought to
be drying up. Worse, certain good names were thought to be in the wrong
hands. As a Web presence became a near-necessity for large businesses, the
realization that corporate marquee names such as avis.com and
mcdonalds.com already had been reserved, first-come, first-served, by
individuals with no connections to the Avis car rental company or
McDonald’s hamburger restaurants caused severe and consistent
consternation among famous trademark holders.
How then to create new, fertile turf such as .biz and .info  when
corporate interests—including those who operated the Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) who together are the Internet’s pathways—already had
their hands full attempting to claim control over their corporate brand
names within .com, .net, and .org?
Further, through a Byzantine tangle of cooperative agreements
offered by the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), the purpose of whichJONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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was to promote the development and use of networks, one company—
Network Solutions—was by 1995 the registration and renewal authority for
all domain names in .com, .net, and .org, sitting astride a booming and
essentially monopolized business. Network Solutions also had become the
technical operator of the “A root”—the “list of lists”—the authoritative set
of pointers to all sublists of “second-level” domain names, i.e., those
ending in .com, .au, and any other suffix. As Mueller documents, Network
Solutions had made it clear to Jon Postel—a researcher and IETF leader
who by acclamation among the original Net designers was the “Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority” with supposed custody over the root—that
Network Solutions would not add to its list of lists without direction from
the National Science Foundation, something NSF had never done or
previously been asked to do.
Without cooperation from Network Solutions and commercial ISPs,
Postel and his colleagues within the IETF could not readily expand the
ever-more-precious domain name turf, and they realized that the issue had
dimensions well beyond the technical. They convened an “International Ad
Hoc Committee” to devise a much more formal process for setting up turf
rules. Network Solutions refused to acknowledge the IAHC’s authority—
which was, to be sure, self-proclaimed—sparking a constitutional crisis as
stark as it was abstruse. At Postel’s request, eight of the Internet’s thirteen
name root servers, each previously a replica of the “A root” and thus
collectively the source of answers for questions like “who manages the
numeric destinations of names ending in .com,” were adjusted by their
operators—themselves doing work thanks to a handshake rather than a
contract—to retrieve their domain name data from Postel’s own root server,
a test that might demonstrate that control of the domain naming system
could be wrested from Network Solutions.
7
“We were concerned,” said an understated spokesperson for Network
Solutions.  “It points to the instability of a system run by volunteers.”
8
Network Solutions wasn’t the only one concerned. The National Science
Foundation, not wanting to take on any role which would require it to pick
winners and losers in anything other than the allocation of grants, passed
the tangle to a unit of the Department of Commerce: the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”), whose
charter is “to spur innovation, encourage competition, help create jobs and
provide consumers with more choices and better quality
7.S e e  Dominic Gates, Culture Clash in the Root Zone: Should Jon Postel Be the
Master of Your Domain?, PreText Magazine, March 1998, at http://www.pretext.com/
mar98/features/story4.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
8.I d .JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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telecommunications products and services at lower prices.”
9 NTIA’s staff
began to talk to anyone who appeared to be related to the conflict, and over
time, with the help of seemingly endless worldwide consultations with
interested technical, business, and political camps, hammered out the
“White Paper” statement of policy that said, in effect, govern yourself.
10
This story emphasizes that there were competing claims to ownership
of the root and no easy way to choose among them, substantively or
procedurally. And, despite the U.S. government’s desire to back away from
any public sector management of domain names specifically and perhaps
the Internet generally, the White Paper by no means was a complete
abdication. After all, the government simply could have let private parties
in a position to assert control of the root negotiate or battle it out, perhaps
asking courts to require desired action or forbearance from rivals. Instead,
the White Paper contained important caveats that ensured that the
Commerce Department could choose, and therefore shape, the nominally
private authority that would answer its call. The NTIA’s actions eclipsed
former efforts at resolution; the IAHC was dissolved and the
“memorandum of understanding” it had generated lay fallow in its
repository at the International Telecommunications Union.
11
It’s not clear what Mueller thinks of this strategy, in part because he
seems ambivalent about the need for central coordination of domain names
in the first instance. After several pages of analysis, Mueller punts on the
issue of “alternative roots,” by which ISPs—and, in some implementations,
their respective users—could be encouraged to determine whose root
among multiple ones would provide direction regarding the sources of
authoritative data about who manages .com, .net, etc. He sees no easy way
to choose between the convenience of a single point of coordination
inherent in a natural monopoly of the root and the benefits of fostering a
competitive regime in which different root operators are encouraged to
sprout, possibly fragmenting the Internet experience from one user to the
next.
12 This equivocation leaves open the question of whether the U.S.
government should have simply walked away rather than prodding ICANN
into existence. I believe alternative roots are an awful idea, for many of the
reasons articulated by the IETF/IAB in a document released perhaps
9.S e e  NTIA Charter, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ntiafacts.htm (last
modified May 6, 1998).
10.S e e   Mgmt. of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741 (June 10, 1998),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm.
11.S e e  gTLD-MoU: Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding, at
http://www.gtld-mou.org (last updated Aug. 12, 1999); IAHC: Internet International Ad Hoc
Committee, at http://www.iahc.org (last updated May 26, 1997).
12. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 50-56.JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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specifically (and therefore politically) to bolster ICANN’s
authority,
13 and, given that nothing legally prohibits their deployment, the
market has so far agreed.
14 It’s clear Mueller has given much thought
himself to the issue. His account would benefit, and perhaps at some point
will be augmented, by a clear statement articulating whether he believes a
central coordinating function in the public interest is needed, and what role,
if any, the U.S. government should have played, or should continue to play,
in its shape.
Similarly, Mueller’s views on the alternatives to ICANN’s structure
remain comparatively shrouded, if indeed he believes there should be any
central coordinating body operating in the public interest. He points out the
flaws in arguments that ICANN should be run like the IETF, for example,
on lines of informal consensus. While this miraculously seems to work for
Internet architectural questions with no obvious political or financial
winners and losers, the ineffectiveness of good faith and handshakes all
around to resolve domain name disputes is precisely what set Postel to the
strategy of isolating domain name issues within a different kind
of organization.
I attended several meetings of the International Forum on the White
Paper (“IFWP”) in the aftermath of the U.S. government’s call for a new
nonprofit domain name authority. Mueller well describes the heady
confusion of the summer of 1998 as Postel, Network Solutions, and others
vied to gather the political momentum to found “Newco.”
15 Professor
Tamar Frankel of Boston University had been asked to chair the initial
meetings by the shifting set of those organizing them, and at her insistence
the IFWP participants emphasized those points on which they could find
consensus—which, unsurprisingly in retrospect, turned out to be a feel-
good laundry list of rights and benefits that did little to suggest how to
resolve actual conflicts. Network Solutions, seeing Postel, independent of
the IFWP, issue iterative drafts of proposed by-laws concrete enough to
form the basis of a new organization, finally simply drafted its own
“community consensus” by-laws, but as Mueller points out, consensus was
nearly impossible to gauge. The best one could do was poll to see if more
than a handful of people present at one of the IFWP meetings objected to a
particular idea.
One of the more specific ideas in play was that of a global electorate
that could populate some or all of Newco’s board. Postel, and apparently
13.S e e  INTERNET ARCHITECTURE BOARD, IAB TECHNICAL COMMENT ON THE UNIQUE
DNS ROOT RFC 2826 (May 2000), at http://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2826.txt.
14. See http://www.new.net for one such provider.
15. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 175-180.JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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most others identified with the IETF (those described in Mueller’s accurate
if valenced terms as “allergic to democracy”) were indeed averse to such an
idea. He and they chafed at the notion that anyone prodded into filling out a
voter registration form could weigh in equally on what was still largely a
technical matter, and feared capture by a particular interest that might
orchestrate a voting campaign. Network Solutions, with every incentive to
freeze the status quo as much as possible, liked the idea of a powerful
electorate whose cumbersome approval would be needed for any major
changes.
As Mueller documents, under pressure from the U.S. Commerce
Department the final draft of ICANN’s bylaws contained a commitment to
an electorate choosing half the board’s seats.
16 I participated in the
“membership advisory committee” later chartered by ICANN to turn that
commitment into practice. I shared Mueller’s view that of all the interests
vying for representation, it was the average Internet end user who stood to
be shortchanged. Those of us who were on the committee embraced the
task of designing a process that would allow one person, one vote—
ultimately a check on the board’s power by a distributed group of self-
identified, concerned Internet users who might be roused to respond to
important issues or abuses of power.
It is hard to discern whether Mueller believes the ICANN election of
2000 was a success. He notes, perhaps approvingly, that the victors were
themselves critics of ICANN.
17 Africa’s seat on the board was chosen
among 130 voters continent-wide; North America’s by 3,449.
18 Asia
witnessed 17,745 registered voters, by some accounts thanks to a
nationalistic competition between China and Japan that included thousands
of attempted (and failed) last-minute registrations from the People’s
Republic (The Japanese candidate won in a landslide.).
19
Some would view these sorts of results as healthy electioneering, or at
worst each region simply reaping results that are, among other things,
functions of its own level of voter apathy, bias, or sellout. If ICANN’s
elected leadership turns out to be ineffective or otherwise poor—well, at
least the blame rests on everyone, since everyone potentially could have
registered and voted. Mueller seems silent on the question. My own view
has become increasingly skeptical, even as some of the actions taken by
16.I d .  at 184.
17.I d .  at 198-201.
18.S e e  ICANN, at http://www.election.com/us/icann/icannresult.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2002).
19.S e e  i d . ; see also Nominating members—nationalistic competition, NAIS (2001), at
http://www.naisproject.org/report/final/2.2.2.2.3.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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ICANN illustrate obvious flaws in its current policies (and perhaps
therefore its leadership), such as retaining a dispute resolution process with
manifest, well-documented structural defects;
20 refusing to release to one of
its own elected directors, without added promises of confidentiality,
documents to which the director is statutorily entitled;
21 and failing to curb
registrar “slamming” practices.
22 Individuals delegate to their governments
a host of matters to decide, and in international arenas we see coordination
through treaty and sometimes further through intergovernmental
organizations whose members are governments themselves. Mueller
appears to agree that ICANN in its current incarnation, despite its formal
incorporation as a private nonprofit, does not stray far from the desires of
its most powerful stakeholders, including the U.S. government and staff of
the European Commission. Wide-open elections could result in a board far
more combative with those interests, but that is separate from making the
case that such a board would be any more in line with important goals than
the one that exists now, or for that matter more in line with whatever the
old-guard Internet engineering community might have preferred. Mueller’s
project, as an arm’s-length institutional analysis, leaves open the normative
questions of what policies are best for the Net—and what kind of
organization would best be able to pursue them. The closest he comes to
such questions is when he notes that the interests behind famous
trademarks have gotten much of what they desired from the process, which
was more than they were in many cases legally entitled to before ICANN
came into existence. For my part, I doubt that an undefined global
electorate can be of much help—it is at once too weak and dispersed to
serve as a check on board misconduct, while enabling easy domination by
an intense voter registration campaign organized by a narrow interest. It is
difficult enough to get voters at large to concern themselves with electing
heads of state, much less the board members of a difficult-to-understand,
technically oriented organization. Hence the appeal of a merit selection
trustee model—perhaps chosen in part by government representatives—
that Mueller eschews.
20.S e e   Michael Geist, Fair.com? An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 903 (2002); Michael Geist,
Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias Allegations and the ICANN UDRP,  at
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/frameset.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
21.S e e  Auerbach v. ICANN, No. BS 074771 (L.A. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2002), available
at http://www.eff.org/Infra/DNS_control/ICANN_IANA_IAHC/Auerbach_v_ICANN/
20020807_auerbach_judgment.pdf.
22.S e e  Thomas C. Greene, Verisign Accused of DNS Slamming, THE REGISTER, Mar.
26, 2002, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/24577.html.JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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For these reasons I agree with Mueller’s conclusion that ICANN as it
stands, especially on the cusp of eliminating its fascinating if unsatisfying
global membership, is not nearly as sui generis an organization as many
believe, and that it ultimately is an undemocratic creature largely
comprising the government and economic interests it is perhaps meant to
transcend. Yet I am not sure this is as bad as Mueller suggests, and to
explain why, it is helpful to pause and to question the extent to which
domain names are important to the Internet’s future.
Once immersed in the intricacies of the story of ICANN, one might
find it interesting enough in its own right, as simply a study of struggles
among oft-colorful personalities and the institutions and groups in which
they participate. But Mueller has sought to go beyond the mere melodrama
innate to the alliances and rivalries among a complex set of groups and
people, and additionally to spell out why this matters. This has been a
persistent challenge for the civil society groups attempting to raise an alarm
about ICANN to the broader public, and one that may not be easy to meet
on its own terms. The most common marcher in the parade of horribles
offered up to justify broad concern about domain names and ICANN is that
control over the root—and then through a rather complicated strategy of
leverage, control over the assignment of domain names generally—can
ultimately become control over what people can say on the Internet itself, a
set of limits imposed wholly apart from any one sovereign’s laws.
Mueller persuasively identifies the deployment of the “uniform
dispute resolution policy” (“UDRP”) for holders of names within the most
common generic top-level domains as one of ICANN’s most important
activities since its inception. And, to be sure, the UDRP creates
“mechanized rights” by which a domain name holder can be quite
summarily dispossessed of her name if an arbitrator chosen by a challenger
(or, in rarer instances, a panel of arbitrators) finds the name to have been
registered and used in bad faith, contrary to some right of the challenger,
and with no legitimate right or interest in the name by the registrant. While
he traces a number of attempts (by the World Intellectual Property
Organization, in particular) to broaden the scope of challengers’ powers
under the UDRP, one is still left with the question of just how much
domain names matter. That some fetch high prices alone shows that many
matter in the pecuniary sense, but the civil society groups are less interested
in creating a smooth market of entitlements—and Coase, after all, might
figure that initial allocations aren’t of great import so long as the names are
readily and reliably alienable
23—than they are in tying ICANN’s powers to
23. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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the prospect of a diminution of free speech, or a launching pad for political
control. This is a harder case to make; one can create a Web site without
the use of a domain name at all by simply advertising its numeric IP
address, and the advent of search engines assures some potential to get
one’s word out without having to have a short, mnemonic (or, put more
precisely, brand-associated) domain name.
Mueller seems to concede as much, instead seeking to focus attention
on domain name battles as harbingers of the Internet’s future, much as the
importance of the health of the spotted owl is primarily grounded in its
claimed role as a bellwether for the health of an entire forest. “The dirty
little secret of the whole affair is that domain names are not nearly as
valuable or as important as the new institutional regime would like to
pretend they are.”
24 Instead, writes Mueller, they are the front line of a
proxy war which is intended to set “precedents for the treatment of the
entire online economy.”
25 This is a difficult claim to advance since it is by
its nature sweeping while speculative—and because the way in which the
war over domain names is won is, as Mueller emphasizes, through control
over the root. As a technical matter, control over the root means control
over domain names—no more and no less, unless other matters can be
brought to heel through withholding or otherwise controlling domain
names themselves. For example, those who dislike a service such as
Napster, even if they controlled the root, could at the realistic extreme
merely force the elimination of www.napster.com as a domain name, a
victory both extremely unlikely and, should it ever happen, surely Pyrrhic.
Demanding accurate WHOIS data—information on domain name
registrants that is collected (and rarely verified) from registrants when they
ask for a new name—might tie individual identities to particular Web site
name registrations, but this is a staggeringly far cry from an “Internet
driver’s license,” especially since most Internet users do not possess or
need domain names, and many individuals who make available Web sites
do so through free hosting services that, in the absence of billing
verification, themselves do not readily know who their customers are. One
is left having to defend the surely narrower importance of domain names
themselves, or take on the difficult if interesting task of identifying the
ways in which other areas of Internet standards—for example, areas that
remain within the IETF—are being influenced by concerns other than
engineers’ purportedly neutral desires to simply get packets from one place
to another as efficiently as possible. The story of ICANN may not shed a
particularly bright light on that inquiry.
24. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 227.
25.I d .  at 228.JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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I maintain that domain names serve a patently valuable but ill-fitting
directory function
26 that may be eclipsed by another naming scheme, one
without dashes and dots.
27 The scheme might come from browser
manufacturers encouraging their users to enter simple words—and treating
those words as a search for which only one result will be returned. Then
those who write the browsers, or those to whom they pass the words for
search results, will be in a position to say which names lead to which
destinations. Whether or not such a shift takes place, to entertain the idea is
to realize that the idiosyncratic position in which we found the root—
conclusively owned by no one, and with all hands more or less agreeing
that it should be operated according to varying notions of the public
interest—likely will not be repeated for newer Internet developments.
The IETF’s  “requests for comments” ( “RFCs”), which outline key
functions of the Internet, are now firmly asserted as copyrighted by the
Internet Society.
28 The copyright is deployed as a flavor of “copyleft,”
meaning that it is used for the purpose of ensuring the widespread
availability of the standards, preventing their proprietization by any
particular party.
29 The intellectual property behind RFCs is thus held in
trust by the Internet Society—the IETF umbrella group which still retains
some influence over ICANN, and which at this writing has been tentatively
selected by ICANN to run the .org  registry, providing an anticipated
needed infusion of cash to the organization.
30 In other words, there is no
doubt that the Internet Society “owns” its RFCs, and thus no battle is to be
waged over who will rule them. There is only the question of whether the
world at large will pay heed to them as they are published—since an RFC
is not self-enforcing.
Innovations by private firms are either controlled in the traditional
way through various flavors of intellectual property asserted by those firms,
or shepherded through complicated “open” consortia such as Sun’s “Java
Community Process” program.
31
26.I d .  at 105.
27.S e e  Jonathan Zittrain, Keyword: Obsolete, Wired, September 1998, at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/6.09/netizen.html?pg=5.
28.S e e  THE INTERNET SOCIETY, 30 YEARS OF RFCS 18 (April 7, 1999) at http://ftp.rfc-
editor.org/in-notes/rfc2555.
29.S e e  F REE  SOFTWARE  FOUNDATION, INC., WHAT IS COPYLEFT? at
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copyleft.html (last updated July 29, 2002).
30.  See .org Reassignment: Preliminary Staff Report on Evaluation of the Proposals for
Reassignment of the .org Registry at http://www.icann.org/tlds/org/preliminary-evaluation-
report-19aug02.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
31.S e e  The Java Community Process at http://www.jcp.org/ (last visited Sept. 24.
2002).JONZITTRAIN-MAC17.DOC 12/02/02 5:05 PM
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None of these is a model of one-person, one-vote democracy
independent of geographic sovereigns, and perhaps for good reason—I
have argued such democracy is as platonically elusive as the alternative
vague “community consensus” process that Mueller rightfully discounts.
While it has succeeded in the narrow sense that the domain name and
numbering system remains more or less stable and secure, I think it is
increasingly clear that the ICANN experiment has failed to show a
functioning, sustainable middle path between public and private
governance of a common but previously ambiguously controlled resource.
We pay the price now in terms of stagnation of the domain name space and
function, the transfer of names under the UDRP that might arguably be best
left to their original registrants, and lower but still-inflated costs for domain
name registration—the odd rental of names for roughly $15 per year per
name, completely unhinged from anything reflecting underlying costs,
much of which ironically revolve around processing invoices. The initial
mistake in these matters may well have been the National Science
Foundation’s decision to permit Network Solutions to begin charging
individual customers for names, rather than simply subsidizing the function
as a government contribution to a well-running Internet, or in allowing the
price ceiling to be determined by an annual fee rather than by a one-time
initial registration charge, perhaps with further charges to process requested
changes to existing registrations such as transfers to new holders or domain
name hosts.
All told, this is a comparatively low price to pay. To be sure, the
Internet’s future is indeed in question, and many indications point to a Net
much less free—as in free speech, not free beer—than the one we enjoy
today. The movement of data likely will be much more tightly surveyed
and controlled, assisted by changes to network architecture and to the
consumer personal computer itself. A battle is now under way to determine
whether wireless Internet connections can be managed through a rough
technical spread spectrum anarchy, or whether government monopoly
spectrum carveouts will remain the order of the day.
The existence of ICANN does nothing to further dampen the
Internet’s uncertain future in these areas, except perhaps to demonstrate the
fact that as a global polity, Internet users are not capable of governing
themselves. Not, I think, because the root has been appropriated by the
usual suspects, but rather because cyberspace on its own terms has simply
never found its identity as a distinct space with its own values and leaders.
This should not come as a surprise except to the early Internet pioneers
who had reason to think it would indeed be a separate “cyber space,” a
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a conduit for e-mail; second a source for news, weather, and other
information; and distantly a shopping mall.
32 Broadband deployment may
change this,
33 but to see individuals becoming content providers rather than
simply shifting their television consumption to a digital pipe using TCP/IP
will require at least both the development of innovative software around
which communities can form, and a jumpstart to encourage participation in
those virtual communities.
The key for the civic society promoter, in other words, is not in
fighting over such things as domain names, the value of which has been
belatedly identified as precious to powerful parties for reasons that bear
little on civic values. The real challenge lies in maintaining an open
Internet, with points of access and pathways that do not discriminate
against particular users, programs, or data—and then developing paradigm-
altering uses for that Internet that place news, weather, chat, and shopping
into a comfortable background.
32.S e e  PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, DAILY INTERNET ACTIVITIES (Dec.
2001) at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/chart.asp?img=Daily_Internet_
Activities.jpg.
33.S e e  John B. Horrigan & Lee Rainie, The Broadband Difference: How Online
Americans’ Behavior Changes with High-Speed Internet Connections at Home, Pew
Internet & American Life Project, at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_
Broadband_Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).